Sample project: Musterstadt water supply
A small drinking-water plant, walked through the IEC 62443-3-2 path the way Trausto models it: from the system under consideration to zones and conduits, risks, security level targets (SL-T), open tasks and approval.
Fictional sample data. Musterstadt, its plant, the people’s roles and every value on this page are invented and resemble no real installation, customer or employer. It is an example of the method, not a template for your plant.
Zones and conduits
1–2 · System and initial risk
Eleven assets in five zones. Each asset belongs to a functional group; the initial risk of a group is its worst consequence times the likelihood, on a scale of 1 to 5 each.
| Asset | Zone | Functional group |
|---|---|---|
| SCADA server | Z1 Control centre | G1 Disinfection and chlorine dosing |
| Engineering workstation | Z1 Control centre | G1 Disinfection and chlorine dosing |
| Historian | Z1 Control centre | G3 Monitoring and reporting |
| Treatment PLC | Z2 Treatment control | G1 Disinfection and chlorine dosing |
| Chlorine dosing controller | Z2 Treatment control | G1 Disinfection and chlorine dosing |
| Operator HMI panel | Z2 Treatment control | G1 Disinfection and chlorine dosing |
| Pump PLC | Z3 Pump station | G2 Raw-water pumping |
| LTE router | Z3 Pump station | G2 Raw-water pumping |
| VPN gateway | Z4 Remote access DMZ | G4 Remote maintenance |
| Jump host | Z4 Remote access DMZ | G4 Remote maintenance |
| Reservoir level RTU | Z5 Reservoir monitoring | G3 Monitoring and reporting |
| Functional group | Worst consequence | Likelihood | Initial risk |
|---|---|---|---|
| G1 Disinfection and chlorine dosing | 4 · Safety (health of consumers) | 4 · Lowered from 5: a dosing change needs the HMI on site or an engineering account. | 4 × 4 = 16 · High |
| G2 Raw-water pumping | 3 · Operations (supply) | 3 · Lowered from 5: the reservoir bridges a pump outage of about a day. | 3 × 3 = 9 · Medium |
| G3 Monitoring and reporting | 2 · Operations (supply) | 2 · Lowered from 5: readings only, no control function. | 2 × 2 = 4 · Low |
| G4 Remote maintenance | 3 · Operations (supply) | 4 · Lowered from 5: sessions are opened per request. | 4 × 3 = 12 · High |
3–4 · Zones, conduits and the decision gate
The tolerable risk is “Low” (score up to 5), the platform default of the IEC 62443 methodology, confirmed by the organisation. A zone takes the worst initial risk of its assets; above the tolerable risk it needs the detailed risk assessment. A conduit needs it too, unless it stays inside the system and both its zones are within the tolerable risk.
| Zone | Initial risk | Detailed assessment |
|---|---|---|
| Z1 Control centre | 16 · High | Required — Initial risk above the tolerable risk. |
| Z2 Treatment control | 16 · High | Required — Initial risk above the tolerable risk. |
| Z3 Pump station | 9 · Medium | Required — Initial risk above the tolerable risk. |
| Z4 Remote access DMZ | 12 · High | Required — Initial risk above the tolerable risk. |
| Z5 Reservoir monitoring | 4 · Low | Not required — Within the tolerable risk: the RTU reports the level and cannot change a setpoint. |
| Conduit | Between | Connection | Detailed assessment |
|---|---|---|---|
| C1 | Z1 Control centre ↔ Z2 Treatment control | Fibre, through the plant firewall | Required — A connected zone is above the tolerable risk. |
| C2 | Z1 Control centre ↔ Z3 Pump station | Site-to-site VPN over LTE | Required — A connected zone is above the tolerable risk. |
| C3 | Z4 Remote access DMZ ↔ Z1 Control centre | Maintenance sessions from the jump host | Required — A connected zone is above the tolerable risk. |
| C4 | Z4 Remote access DMZ ↔ Office network (outside the SuC) | VPN for maintenance staff | Required — Crosses the boundary of the system. |
| C5 | Z5 Reservoir monitoring ↔ Z1 Control centre | Telemetry over a leased line | Required — A connected zone is above the tolerable risk. |
5 · Detailed risk assessment
A selection of the detailed risks. The inherent risk is rated before the countermeasures. The residual risk is the assessor’s own rating after them. Trausto does not compute it; it shows what the zone’s or conduit’s 62443-3-3 status supports as a plausibility bound, and a rating below that bound needs a written reason.
| Risk | Zone or conduit | Threat | Inherent | Countermeasures | Residual |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| R1 | Z2 Treatment control | Unauthorised change of the chlorine dosing setpoint from the engineering workstation | 4 × 4 = 16 · High | Named engineering accounts with multifactor login; setpoint limits enforced in the dosing controller; a second person approves each dosing change. | 3 × 4 = 12 · High Supported by the 62443-3-3 status: High Accepted above the tolerable risk until the open gaps of zone Z2 are closed (SR 3.4 partly, SR 7.3 RE 1 not implemented); a hardware interlock follows as an open task. |
| R2 | Z1 Control centre | Ransomware brought in on removable media to the SCADA server | 3 × 4 = 12 · High | USB storage disabled; application allowlisting; offline backups, restore tested every quarter. | 1 × 4 = 4 · Low Supported by the 62443-3-3 status: Low Within the tolerable risk |
| R3 | Z3 Pump station | Attack on the LTE router of the pump station from the internet | 3 × 3 = 9 · Medium | No inbound services; VPN with device certificates; firewall rules limited to the control centre. | 1 × 3 = 3 · Low Supported by the 62443-3-3 status: Low Within the tolerable risk |
| R4 | Z4 Remote access DMZ | Exploitation of an unpatched VPN gateway | 4 × 4 = 16 · High | Patches within 14 days of a vendor advisory; only the VPN port exposed; gateway logs monitored. | 2 × 2 = 4 · Low Supported by the 62443-3-3 status: Low Within the tolerable risk |
| R5 | C3 (Conduit) | Maintenance session opened with stolen credentials | 4 × 4 = 16 · High | Multifactor login; access only through the jump host; each session approved per request and recorded. | 1 × 4 = 4 · Low Supported by the 62443-3-3 status: Low Within the tolerable risk |
Security level targets
Trausto proposes an SL-T per zone from the worst inherent risk: each band above the tolerable band raises it by one level. The table is a declared default, not a rule of the standard; the SL-T is the assessor’s decision.
| Zone | Worst inherent risk | Proposed SL-T | SL-T decided |
|---|---|---|---|
| Z1 Control centre | 12 · High | SL 3 | SL 3 |
| Z2 Treatment control | 16 · High | SL 3 | SL 3 |
| Z3 Pump station | 9 · Medium | SL 2 | SL 2 |
| Z4 Remote access DMZ | 16 · High | SL 3 | SL 3 |
| Z5 Reservoir monitoring | — | from the initial risk | SL 1 |
IEC 62443-3-3 status of zone Z2 (SL-T 3)
An SL-T of 3 selects the system requirements and enhancements up to level 3. A selection, with the short titles Trausto uses, not the text of the standard:
| Entry | Status |
|---|---|
| SR 1.1Human users are identified and authenticated | Implemented |
| SR 1.1 RE 2Multifactor authentication over untrusted networks | Implemented |
| SR 2.1 RE 3A supervisor can override | Implemented |
| SR 3.4Software and information integrity is checked | Partly |
| SR 5.1 RE 2The control network runs without non-control networks | Implemented |
| SR 7.3 RE 1Backups are verified | Not implemented |
Every other entry of zone Z2 up to level 3 is recorded as implemented. The two gaps keep FR3 and FR7 at level 1, so the status supports no lower residual than the inherent band for a risk of this zone.
Every entry up to the SL-T recorded as implemented: Z1 Control centre, SL-T 3 · Z3 Pump station, SL-T 2 · Z4 Remote access DMZ, SL-T 3 · C3 (Conduit), SL-T 3
6–7 · Result
What the assessment hands on: an SL-T for each zone, countermeasures per risk, the gaps as tasks with an owner, and each detailed risk approved by name and date.
Open tasks
| Task | From | Owner (role) |
|---|---|---|
| Hardware interlock on the chlorine dosing pump | Risk R1, accepted above the tolerable risk | Head of operations |
| Verify the controller backups | SR 7.3 RE 1 in zone Z2, not implemented | Automation engineer |
| Signed firmware for the treatment PLC | SR 3.4 in zone Z2, partly implemented | Automation engineer |
Review comment
An external auditor in the reviewer role reads the project and comments; they cannot change the analysis. Their comment on R1:
R1: please attach the configuration of the controller limits as evidence.
The plant manager approves each detailed risk; R1 with its acceptance above the tolerable risk. The report, generated in the browser as PDF, DOCX or HTML, contains these tables, the decisions and their reasons.
Fictional sample data. Musterstadt, its plant, the people’s roles and every value on this page are invented and resemble no real installation, customer or employer. It is an example of the method, not a template for your plant.
See Trausto on a sample project
In a single technical session we work through a fictional sample plant — its zones, conduits and security level targets (SL-T) — and show how Trausto turns it into IEC 62443 evidence an auditor can follow. No data from your own plant is needed; if you want to discuss your installation, we agree on how separately, not through the contact form.