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Sample project: Musterstadt water supply

A small drinking-water plant, walked through the IEC 62443-3-2 path the way Trausto models it: from the system under consideration to zones and conduits, risks, security level targets (SL-T), open tasks and approval.

Fictional sample data. Musterstadt, its plant, the people’s roles and every value on this page are invented and resemble no real installation, customer or employer. It is an example of the method, not a template for your plant.

Zones and conduits

System under consideration (SuC) Z4 Remote access DMZ Z1 Control centre Z2 Treatment control Z3 Pump station Z5 Reservoir monitoring Office network (outside the SuC) SL-T 3 SL-T 3 SL-T 3 SL-T 2 SL-T 1 C3 C4 C1 C2 C5
Diagram drawn for this page, not a screenshot of the app.

1–2 · System and initial risk

Eleven assets in five zones. Each asset belongs to a functional group; the initial risk of a group is its worst consequence times the likelihood, on a scale of 1 to 5 each.

Asset Zone Functional group
SCADA server Z1 Control centre G1 Disinfection and chlorine dosing
Engineering workstation Z1 Control centre G1 Disinfection and chlorine dosing
Historian Z1 Control centre G3 Monitoring and reporting
Treatment PLC Z2 Treatment control G1 Disinfection and chlorine dosing
Chlorine dosing controller Z2 Treatment control G1 Disinfection and chlorine dosing
Operator HMI panel Z2 Treatment control G1 Disinfection and chlorine dosing
Pump PLC Z3 Pump station G2 Raw-water pumping
LTE router Z3 Pump station G2 Raw-water pumping
VPN gateway Z4 Remote access DMZ G4 Remote maintenance
Jump host Z4 Remote access DMZ G4 Remote maintenance
Reservoir level RTU Z5 Reservoir monitoring G3 Monitoring and reporting
Functional group Worst consequence Likelihood Initial risk
G1 Disinfection and chlorine dosing 4 · Safety (health of consumers) 4 · Lowered from 5: a dosing change needs the HMI on site or an engineering account. 4 × 4 = 16 · High
G2 Raw-water pumping 3 · Operations (supply) 3 · Lowered from 5: the reservoir bridges a pump outage of about a day. 3 × 3 = 9 · Medium
G3 Monitoring and reporting 2 · Operations (supply) 2 · Lowered from 5: readings only, no control function. 2 × 2 = 4 · Low
G4 Remote maintenance 3 · Operations (supply) 4 · Lowered from 5: sessions are opened per request. 4 × 3 = 12 · High

3–4 · Zones, conduits and the decision gate

The tolerable risk is “Low” (score up to 5), the platform default of the IEC 62443 methodology, confirmed by the organisation. A zone takes the worst initial risk of its assets; above the tolerable risk it needs the detailed risk assessment. A conduit needs it too, unless it stays inside the system and both its zones are within the tolerable risk.

Zone Initial risk Detailed assessment
Z1 Control centre 16 · High Required — Initial risk above the tolerable risk.
Z2 Treatment control 16 · High Required — Initial risk above the tolerable risk.
Z3 Pump station 9 · Medium Required — Initial risk above the tolerable risk.
Z4 Remote access DMZ 12 · High Required — Initial risk above the tolerable risk.
Z5 Reservoir monitoring 4 · Low Not required — Within the tolerable risk: the RTU reports the level and cannot change a setpoint.
Conduit Between Connection Detailed assessment
C1 Z1 Control centre ↔ Z2 Treatment control Fibre, through the plant firewall Required — A connected zone is above the tolerable risk.
C2 Z1 Control centre ↔ Z3 Pump station Site-to-site VPN over LTE Required — A connected zone is above the tolerable risk.
C3 Z4 Remote access DMZ ↔ Z1 Control centre Maintenance sessions from the jump host Required — A connected zone is above the tolerable risk.
C4 Z4 Remote access DMZ ↔ Office network (outside the SuC) VPN for maintenance staff Required — Crosses the boundary of the system.
C5 Z5 Reservoir monitoring ↔ Z1 Control centre Telemetry over a leased line Required — A connected zone is above the tolerable risk.

5 · Detailed risk assessment

A selection of the detailed risks. The inherent risk is rated before the countermeasures. The residual risk is the assessor’s own rating after them. Trausto does not compute it; it shows what the zone’s or conduit’s 62443-3-3 status supports as a plausibility bound, and a rating below that bound needs a written reason.

Risk Zone or conduit Threat Inherent Countermeasures Residual
R1 Z2 Treatment control Unauthorised change of the chlorine dosing setpoint from the engineering workstation 4 × 4 = 16 · High Named engineering accounts with multifactor login; setpoint limits enforced in the dosing controller; a second person approves each dosing change. 3 × 4 = 12 · High Supported by the 62443-3-3 status: High Accepted above the tolerable risk until the open gaps of zone Z2 are closed (SR 3.4 partly, SR 7.3 RE 1 not implemented); a hardware interlock follows as an open task.
R2 Z1 Control centre Ransomware brought in on removable media to the SCADA server 3 × 4 = 12 · High USB storage disabled; application allowlisting; offline backups, restore tested every quarter. 1 × 4 = 4 · Low Supported by the 62443-3-3 status: Low Within the tolerable risk
R3 Z3 Pump station Attack on the LTE router of the pump station from the internet 3 × 3 = 9 · Medium No inbound services; VPN with device certificates; firewall rules limited to the control centre. 1 × 3 = 3 · Low Supported by the 62443-3-3 status: Low Within the tolerable risk
R4 Z4 Remote access DMZ Exploitation of an unpatched VPN gateway 4 × 4 = 16 · High Patches within 14 days of a vendor advisory; only the VPN port exposed; gateway logs monitored. 2 × 2 = 4 · Low Supported by the 62443-3-3 status: Low Within the tolerable risk
R5 C3 (Conduit) Maintenance session opened with stolen credentials 4 × 4 = 16 · High Multifactor login; access only through the jump host; each session approved per request and recorded. 1 × 4 = 4 · Low Supported by the 62443-3-3 status: Low Within the tolerable risk

Security level targets

Trausto proposes an SL-T per zone from the worst inherent risk: each band above the tolerable band raises it by one level. The table is a declared default, not a rule of the standard; the SL-T is the assessor’s decision.

Zone Worst inherent risk Proposed SL-T SL-T decided
Z1 Control centre 12 · High SL 3 SL 3
Z2 Treatment control 16 · High SL 3 SL 3
Z3 Pump station 9 · Medium SL 2 SL 2
Z4 Remote access DMZ 16 · High SL 3 SL 3
Z5 Reservoir monitoring — from the initial risk SL 1

IEC 62443-3-3 status of zone Z2 (SL-T 3)

An SL-T of 3 selects the system requirements and enhancements up to level 3. A selection, with the short titles Trausto uses, not the text of the standard:

Entry Status
SR 1.1Human users are identified and authenticated Implemented
SR 1.1 RE 2Multifactor authentication over untrusted networks Implemented
SR 2.1 RE 3A supervisor can override Implemented
SR 3.4Software and information integrity is checked Partly
SR 5.1 RE 2The control network runs without non-control networks Implemented
SR 7.3 RE 1Backups are verified Not implemented

Every other entry of zone Z2 up to level 3 is recorded as implemented. The two gaps keep FR3 and FR7 at level 1, so the status supports no lower residual than the inherent band for a risk of this zone.

Every entry up to the SL-T recorded as implemented: Z1 Control centre, SL-T 3 · Z3 Pump station, SL-T 2 · Z4 Remote access DMZ, SL-T 3 · C3 (Conduit), SL-T 3

6–7 · Result

What the assessment hands on: an SL-T for each zone, countermeasures per risk, the gaps as tasks with an owner, and each detailed risk approved by name and date.

Open tasks

Task From Owner (role)
Hardware interlock on the chlorine dosing pump Risk R1, accepted above the tolerable risk Head of operations
Verify the controller backups SR 7.3 RE 1 in zone Z2, not implemented Automation engineer
Signed firmware for the treatment PLC SR 3.4 in zone Z2, partly implemented Automation engineer

Review comment

An external auditor in the reviewer role reads the project and comments; they cannot change the analysis. Their comment on R1:

R1: please attach the configuration of the controller limits as evidence.

The plant manager approves each detailed risk; R1 with its acceptance above the tolerable risk. The report, generated in the browser as PDF, DOCX or HTML, contains these tables, the decisions and their reasons.

Fictional sample data. Musterstadt, its plant, the people’s roles and every value on this page are invented and resemble no real installation, customer or employer. It is an example of the method, not a template for your plant.

See Trausto on a sample project

In a single technical session we work through a fictional sample plant — its zones, conduits and security level targets (SL-T) — and show how Trausto turns it into IEC 62443 evidence an auditor can follow. No data from your own plant is needed; if you want to discuss your installation, we agree on how separately, not through the contact form.